An attempt to separate reason from passion, cognition from emotion, has been a theme in western culture for centuries. The ability to regulate one's passions embodies the very essence of both classical philosophy and modern enlightenment sensibilities. Descartes, for example, viewed cognitions and emotions as essentially separate entities. Freud's tripartite model of personality clearly illustrates the duality between cognition and emotion, particularly with regard to the struggle between the id and the superego. Later in this century, debates over the temporal relation between cognition and emotion received much attention in the psychological study of emotion (see, e.g., Zajonc, 1980); terms such as ''cool'' and ''hot'' systems began to be used to represent cognition and emotion, respectively (Estes, 1972) . Such language is still in use today to delineate cognition and emotion: cognitions are largely viewed as cold and emotions are largely used in a pejorative manner (see, e.g., Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Parrott & Schulkin, 1993) . In this essay, we argue from a contrarian point of view that such distinctions may be largely academic and that recent advances and examples from affective neuroscience (Davidson & Sutton, 1995; LeDoux, 1996; Panksepp, 1998) now suggest that emotions may best be viewed within an information processing framework. We view the brain in part as an information processor within which emotions can be studied. We provide an example from our work on emotion that suggests that the study of emotion is palatable within such a framework and discuss how such a conceptualization may have implications to both basic and clinical research on emotion.
